Interstate Compact Agency as Regional Legislature—A New Basis for Official Immunity by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 19
January 1980
Interstate Compact Agency as Regional
Legislature—A New Basis for Official Immunity
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Interstate Compact Agency as Regional Legislature—A New Basis for Official Immunity, 19 Urb. L. Ann. 240 (1980)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/11
INTERSTATE COMPACT AGENCY AS REGIONAL
LEGISLATURE-A NEW BASIS FOR OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
With the consent of Congress,' states can contract to create an in-
terstate compact agency.2 A compact agency is, often by express
terms of its authorizing compact, a distinct legal entity,3 although it
exhibits both state4 and federal' characteristics. Traditionally, judi-
1. Congressional consent to interstate compacts is a constitutional requirement:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress. . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. See note 5 infra on
the question of whether Congressional consent transforms an interstate compact into
federal law.
2. In the absence of a constitutional definition, the nature and scope of compacts
and compact agencies has been the subject of considerable judicial and scholarly
speculation. The consensus is that a compact is a contract that, by virtue of the in-
volvement of sovereign states as parties, is recognized as "an identifiable and separate
document." R. LEACH & R. SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COM-
PACTS 14 (1959). See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
SINCE 1925, 42 (1951). Modem compact agencies include the Bi-State Development
Agency (Missouri-Illinois), the Port of New York Authority (New York-New Jersey),
the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (New Jersey-Pennsylvania), the
Interstate Sanitation Commission (New Jersey-New York-Connecticut), and the Ten-
nessee-Missouri Bridge Commission.
3. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, art. Ill(a), 83
Stat. 360 (1969) ("There is created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency as a separate
legal entity.").
4. As a rule, the courts have found that interstate compact agencies are agencies
of the participating states. Eg., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 254
F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1958) (compact agency is agency or instrument of the signatory
states), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Howell v. Port of New York
Auth., 34 F. Supp. 797, 801 (D.N.J. 1940) (bistate agency is joint or common instru-
ment of the states); Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182, 182 A.2d 514, 515 (1962)
(bistate agency is an agency carrying out an executive function of the state). See Lake
Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399 (1979). See generally
R. LEACH & R. SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 22 (1959);
Reimel, Interstate Agencies, Their Tort Dilemmas and a Federal Solution, 15 DuQ. U.
L. REV. 407, 414-20 (1977).
5. Although compact agencies typically are treated as state agencies, the authority
by which they operate is federal law. Courts have long recognized that by consenting
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cial treatment of these agencies has been exclusively in terms of a
state-federal dichotomy.6 In determining immunity from suit, courts
generally have found that interstate agencies are the agencies of the
participating states,7 hence the Eleventh Amendment immunizes
them from damage suits.' Until recently, no court squarely ad-
to an interstate agreement, Congress transforms the compact into "a law of the
Union." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,
566 (1851); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. TRPA, 507 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1974)
(compact is federal statute for purposes of federal question jurisdiction), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 974 (1975). Contra, People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455, 456
(1870) (the Court's jurisdiction to review a state court's judgment construing a com-
pact denied on ground that a compact was not a federal statute); Yancoskie v. Dela-
ware River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 724-26 (3rd Cir. 1975) (mere Congressional
approval of a compact does not raise it to the level of a federal statute for federal
question jurisdiction purposes). But see Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning
Agcy, 440 U.S. 391, 399 (1979) ("While congressional consent to the original compact
was required, the states may confer additional powers and duties on [the compact
agency] without further congressional action."). For purposes of certiorari jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court has found that Congressional consent to an interstate com-
pact constitutes a federal "title, right, privilege or immunity." Delaware Joint Toll
Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940). See generally J. WINTERS,
INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AREAS 19 (1962); Engdahl, Construction of Interstate
Compacts. A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987 (1965).
6. Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts.-A Questionable Federal Question,
51 VA. L. REV. 987, 1039 (1965).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in federal court by a state or its
citizens against another state:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The amendment does not specifically bar suits against a state by its own citizens.
The Supreme Court has consistently held, however, "that an unconsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by" for-
eign citizens. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973);
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. I
(1890); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857, 862 (8th Cir.
1958), rev'don other grounds, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
A state may, of course, choose to waive any immunity from suit that it might enjoy.
Evidence of a state's consent to be sued, however, must be unequivocal, either in the
form of express statutory language, or by clear implication. Murray v. Wilson Distil-
ling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909) ("by the most express language or by such over-
whelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
construction"); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 520 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 911 (1976) (waiver not implied unless state clearly declares intent to submit
its fiscal problems to courts other than its own); Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst.,




dressed the question of immunity for officers of coinpact agencies. 9
In Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,"° the Ninth Circuit
broke from the traditional judicial view of compact agencies by find-
ing agency officials immune from suit based on their identification as
"regional legislators."''
In Jacobson, residents and landowners of the Tahoe Basin area
brought actions for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief
against the compact agency' 2 and agency officers authorized to regu-
late regional land use.' 3 Plaintiffs sued under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, alleging that an agency ordinance restricting
land use in the area constituted an inverse condemnation or a "tak-
ing" of their property. 4 Defendant Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA) and its officers moved for dismissal, arguing the
complaints failed to state a cause of action against them.'
5
statutory language consenting to suit in federal court). Further, a state's waiver of
immunity to suit in its own courts will not serve to waive its immunity to suit in
federal courts. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276
(1959); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
9. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 944 (9th Cir.
1977). But see note 23 infra.
10. 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 1365.
12. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) is an authority created by a
1968 compact between California and Nevada to regulate the development of land
and natural resources in the Lake Tahoe Basin area. The compact provides that the
agency's governing body be appointed from the respective states by certain counties,
agencies and executives of the states. The agency is financed primarily by assess-
ments on the area counties, and the compact specifically provides that no obligation
contracted by the TRPA will bind either the states or any political subdivisions of the
states. Congress approved the compact in 1969. League to Save Lake Tahoe v.
TRPA, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66800 (West Supp. 1974);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 277.190 (1973).
13. Other defendants were the states of California and Nevada, several counties
in the Lake Tahoe Basin area, and the United States.
14. The Land Use Ordinance enacted by the TRPA in 1972 attempted to "main-
tain an equilibrium between the Region's natural endowment and its manmade envi-
ronment." The practical effect of the ordinance was an almost complete prohibition
on the uses to which the plaintiffs had put their land. The Land Use Ordinance re-
classified residential areas for "general forest" and "recreation," and reclassified a
lumber company's land in the area for "general forest," "recreation," and "conserva-
tion." Plaintiff Jacobson was a partner in a limited partnership that owned land in
the area at the time of the Land Use Ordinance's enactment. Western Int'l Hotels v.
TRPA, 387 F. Supp. 429 (D. Nev. 1975).
15. Id. at 438.
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The federal district court dismissed the complaints 6 and dismissed
all defendant parties except the TRPA.' 7 On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the dismissal of the complaints. The court agreed that
the TRPA was a proper party and remanded the question whether
the agency officers were immune from the suit. 8 On rehearing, the
court found that the TRPA was an agency of the participating
states 9 and therefore was immune from suit under the Eleventh
16 The district court held that the acts of the agency were entitled to the same
presumption of constitutionality afforded state legislative acts and it dismissed the
actions on finding that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption. Id. at 434-38.
17 The court dismissed all counties named as defendants, finding that the TRPA
was not an agent of the counties, that the counties were not liable for any monetary
damages assessed to the TRPA, and that plaintiffs could obtain complete relief with-
out joining the counties. The states were dismissed on the alternate theories that the
TRPA was a subdivision of the states and that the ordinance was a joint TRPA-state
undertaking. The court did not decide whether the TRPA was a state agency for it
held that if the ordinance were found to be a condemnation, it would constitute an
action beyond the authority of the agency, and thus it could not be an action of the
state. The United States was dismissed upon the finding that the TRPA was not a
federal agency, and that the United States' involvement with the compact was insuffi-
cient to hold it responsible for the TRPA's acts. The court dismissed the members of
TRPA's governing board, holding that governmental officers are immune from liabil-
ity for acts undertaken in the exercise of their discretionary functions. Id. at 438-39.
18. The court of appeal's resolution of the immunity issues in the first hearing was
virtually identical to that of the second opinion. Since the court withdrew the prior
opinion, treatment of those issues is preserved for discussion of the court's final ren-
dering.
19. The court reached its primary conclusion on this issue without citing case au-
thority. of which there is an abundance. See note 3 supra. The court reasoned: "With
Congress' constitutionally required approval, the TRPA exercises a species of state
authority. In effect, the bi-state Authority serves as an agency of the participating
states, exercising a specially aggregated slice of state power." Jacobson v. TRPA, 566
F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Jacobson v. TRPA, 558 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir.
1977) (the court declined to decide whether the TRPA was an arm of the state). The
court's cautious analysis of this issue perhaps suggests its ultimate characterization of
the agency as a "regional legislature." The court only indirectly offered case author-
ity for the conclusion that the TRPA is an agency of the state. Jacobson v. TRPA, 566
F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1977).
On certiorari, the Supreme Court did not squarely approach the question. While
strongly suggesting that the TRPA was not an agency of the participating states, the
Court redirected the inquiry to the question of whether the states intended to share
their immunity with the bistate agency. In the view of the Court, the significant ques-
tion was not whether the TRPA was a state agency, but whether the states intended to
bestow their immunity upon it. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agcy.,




Amendment.2" Again, the court remanded the issue of immunity for
the agency officers, but provided specific guidelines to determine the
legal issue. In this context the court found that the compact agency
was, in effect, a "regional legislature,"2 whose officers were "regional
legislators." The court concluded that, as "regional legislators," the
20. In reaching the conclusion of agency immunity, the court relied almost en-
tirely upon Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). See
text accompanying notes 30-36 infra.
21. The court's first opinion credited David Engdahl with the general concept of
interstate legislation. Jacobson v. TRPA, 558 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1977).
We are accustomed to thinking in terms of only two principle species of legisla-
tion: federal and state. . . . [S]eemingly all of the discussion of compacts by
other writers and the courts, has proceeded on the assumption that compacts fit,
or must be fit, into one or the other of these two species, the only ones which the
federal jurisdictional statutes. . . recognize. But it may be more fruitful to rec-
ognize compacts as a third and distinct species: interstate legislation. The dissim-
ilarities between compacts and ordinary state legislation are certainly no less
significant than the similarities; and at the same time the similarities of compacts
to congressional legislation are not imposing.
Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts. 4 Questionable Federal Question, 51
VA. L. REV. 987, 1039 (1965).
The recognition of compact agencies as regional governments, however, dates back
to the classic Frankfurter-Landis critique of compact agencies in 1925. Frankfurter
and Landis found that the difficult problems facing the nation in the twentieth cen-
tury were regional in character, and that only regional solutions were adequate to
meet the modern challenges. State and federal remedies, they contended, were
neither adequate nor desirable to deal with regional problems. Frankfurter & Landis,
The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L.J. 685 (1925).
The regions are less than the nation and are greater than any one State. The
mechanism of legislation must therefore be greater than that at the disposal of a
single State. National action is the ready alternative. But national action is ei-
ther unavailable or excessive. For a number of interstate situations, Federal con-
trol is wholly outside the present ambit of Federal power, wholly unlikely to be
conferred upon the Federal government by constitutional amendment and, in the
practical tasks of government, wholly unsuited to Federal action even if constitu-
tional power were obtained. With all our unifying processes nothing is clearer
than that in the United States there are being built up regional interests, regional
cultures and regional interdependencies. These produce regional problems call-
ing for regional solutions. Control by the nation would be ill-conceived and in-
trusive. . . . As to these regional problems Congress could not legislate
effectively. Regional interests, regional wisdom and regional pride must be
looked to for solutions.
Id. at 707-08 (footnotes omitted). "The overwhelming difficulties confronting modern
society must not be at the mercy of the false antithesis embodied in the shibboleths
'States-Rights' and 'National Supremacy' . . . .Our regions are realities. Political
thinking must respond to these realities." Id. at 729. See also Reimel, Interstate
Agencies, Their Tort Dilemmas and a Federal Solution, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 407, 425-26
(1977).
[Vol. 19:240
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officers of the TRPA should be granted the same immunity allowed
their state and federal counterparts.22
Although the question of immunity for compact agency officials
was one of first instance,23 the federal courts' previous applications
for Eleventh Amendment immunity suggest a different approach
than that taken by the Ninth Circuit in Jacobson.24 Generally, the
22. The Ninth Circuit noted that official immunity was previously applied only to
state and federal officials. Jacobson v. TRPA, 566 F.2d at 1365 (9th Cir. 1977). Al-
though the court found a different basis of immunity for agency officers, it clearly
stated that the tests for determining whether individual officials would receive immu-
nity for their actions were the same for agency officers as for state and federal officers.
Specifically, the court pointed to Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), as the test of
immunity for officials acting in an executive capacity (qualified immunity varying
with the degree of discretion required), and to Tenney v. Bandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951). as the test for officials acting in a legislative capacity (absolute immunity).
23. The Jacobson court stated that "the question of immunity for officers acting
under the authority of an interstate compact has not been squarely addressed."
Jacobson v. TRPA, 566 F.2d at 1365. In Byram River v. Port Chester, 394 F. Supp.
618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), however, the question came before a federal district court. In
Bvram River, plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief against the Interstate Sanitation
Commission, a tristate compact agency. The commission and a commission officer,
named as a defendant, moved for dismissal on the theory they were immune under
the Eleventh Amendment. The Byram River court declined to decide the constitu-
tional question of the amendment's applicability to compact agencies, but found that
the commission was "sufficiently independent of New York State as not to enjoy sov-
ereign immunity." Id. at 628. See note 36 infra. Addressing itself to the commission
officer's motion to dismiss, the court held that insofar as the commission could not
claim the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, it was "certainly axiomatic" that an
officer of the commission could not do so. The court further noted that, even if the
commission could claim immunity from suit generally, an action against an officer for
prospective injunctive relief would stand.
Bvram River is distinguishable from Jacobson in several respects. First, the Jacob-
son court decided the constitutional question which, by the time the Byram River
decision was rendered, had not been resolved. That is, Jacobson held that the Elev-
enth Amendment was applicable to compact agencies. Second, Byram River found
that the particular agency involved was, on the facts, not entitled to immunity. It is
possible that the holding in Jacobson would preclude such a conclusion today. Fi-
nally, Byram River dealt with an action for injunctive relief, which is a prospective
remedy. rather than monetary damages, and thus avoided the more difficult question.
It has been clear since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits for prospective equitable relief. The real test of
whether the Eleventh Amendment would apply to compact agency officials could
only have been decided in an action for monetary relief, as in Jacobson.
24. The concept of a "regional legislature" as a real, distinct and separate entity
had, prior to Jacobson, appeared only in secondary authorities. See note 21 supra.
The majority of these writers shared the view that compact agencies were operating as
independent governmental entities. They called for judicial recognition of the in-




courts have found that the Eleventh Amendment applies in damage
suits where a state, as a defendant, is the real party in interest.2 A
state usually is found to be the real party in interest when the action
ultimately seeks satisfaction from the state treasury.26 Under this ap-
proach, state agencies and officers are cloaked in Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity because of their financial dependence on state funds.
A frequently cited source of the test for Eleventh Amendment ap-
plicability is Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,27 where peti-
tioner corporation sued the Department of the Treasury of the State
of Indiana for recovery of alleged illegal taxes. The Supreme Court
dismissed the action, finding that it was essentially an action against
the state and therefore barred by the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The Court reasoned that in cases where the Eleventh
Amendment potentially applied, the nature and effect of the judg-
ment determined whether the action was characterized as one against
the state. "[Wihen the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest
and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit."'2 8 Thus,
analysis of compact agencies found they were far from independent. Leach and Sugg
found that, in practical operations, compact agencies constituted an affirmation of the
traditional state-federal view of government. The states, they found, regarded the
agencies as their own select tools to exercise state powers effectively. Yet the states
were at least equally concerned with protecting their powers from both the compact
agencies and the federal government. The writers found that the states' integrity pre-
vailed: "Had the compact agencies gone against this sentiment in any fashion, they
would hardly have survived, much less grown in popularity." R. LEACH & R. SUOG,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS, 214-16 (reprint ed. 1969).
25. See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
26. The financial-dependence test for determining whether a state is the real party
in interest in a suit for damages is essentially the Ford Motor analysis discussed be-
low. See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra. While the effect that a judgment will
have on a state treasury is most determinative, the courts frequently look to other
factors in deciding whether a state is the real party in interest. Among these factors
the courts have suggested that ability to sue and be sued, lack of express authority to
sue, performance by the entity of an essential governmental function, power to take
property in the name of the state, power to take property in its own name, corporate
status, lack of corporate status, financial interest in the state, and lack of financial
interest in the state, are significant. Whitten v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d
177 (Ist Cir. 1974); Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). For an exhaustive list of the factors considered by the courts in
determining whether an agency is an alter ego of a state, see Note, The Eleventh
Amendment as Applied to State Agencies: A Survey of the Cases and a Proposed Model
for Anlaysis, 22 VILL. L. REv. 153, 160-63 (1976).
27. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
28. Id. at 464. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573
[Vol, 19,240
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the Court predicated application of Eleventh Amendment immunity
upon the financial dependence of a department on the state, rather
than on the apparent administrative affiliation per se.29
In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n,30 the Eighth Cir-
cuit applied the Ford Motor analysis to an action against a compact
agency. In Petty, petitioner brought a damage action against the bi-
(1946); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court observed the continuing au-
thority of the FordMotor financial-dependence test: "Thus the rule has evolved that a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public
funds in the State treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." d. at 663. The
Edelman Court noted, however, that not every action that affects state revenues will
be barred. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for prospective equitable
relief. Er Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Edelman, the Court recognized that
many actions for prospective equitable relief will have a significant effect on state
treasuries, but stated that the amendment does not bar such actions. 415 U.S. at 663.
Thus, an action for prospective equitable relief against a state officer may be allowed
under the Eleventh Amendment, even when its effect is to diminish the state treasury.
But see note 39 infra. The Ford Motor test of Eleventh Amendment applicability,
then, may only operate outside the realm of the Ex Parte Young exception.
29. By positing financial relation as the crucial factor for determining whether the
state's immunity will apply to a defendant, the FordMotor analysis appears to antici-
pate inclusion of a broad range of defendants. Because administrative affiliation with
the state is not determinative, a titular officer of the state may or may not be granted
immunity, depending upon whether the requisite financial relation is present. Simi-
larly, an official of a corporation or agency, not normally identified with a state, may
be covered by the state's immunity if a judgment against him would be satisfied by
state funds.
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the
Supreme Court interposed an important caveat to the Ford Motor analysis: "[Tihe
protection afforded by that Amendment is only available to 'one of the United
States.'" Id. at 400. Rejecting the Ford Motor financial-dependence test for deter-
mining whether the Eleventh Amendment applied, the Court ruled that the constitu-
tional immunity did not apply to a compact agency unless it appeared that the states
intended to share their immunity with the agency. Reversing the Ninth Circuit's
Jacobson finding that the amendment immunized the TRPA, the Court held that, on
the facts, the amendment did not apply to the compact agency. The Court looked to
the intent of the participating states, the terms of the compact, and the actual opera-
tion of the agency, and concluded that there appeared to be "no justification for read-
ing additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment." Id. at 401.
Although the Court did not overrule Ford Motor, the practical effect of the Lake
Country Estates holding may be that the courts will not find constitutional immunity
for compact agencies unless contracting states stipulate such an intent in the wording
of their compact.




state commission for the death of an agency employee.3 After con-
sidering the agency's finding, the court found that a judgment against
the commission would adversely affect the participating states, and
concluded that the commission was the agency or instrument of the
states.3 z The court expressly rejected the suggestion that the compact
agency, as a bistate creation, was a separate and distinct entity apart
from the states.33 In the Eighth Circuit's view, the bistate commis-
sion was a common instrument of the states, and congressional con-
sent to the compact sanctioned that view.34 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court,35 assuming that the commission was the agency of
the participating states, addressed itself only to the question of
whether the Commission had waived "any immunity it might have."
The Court held that since the bistate agency had consented to suit in
its authorizing compact, the suit was not barred by any immunity it
might have had.36
31. Plaintiff sued under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920) alleging respon-
dent's negligence in connection with the death of petitioner's husband.
32. Aside from the FordMotor approach, the court considered the function of the
interstate agency. The court found that the states had entered into the compact to
fulfill their respective state obligations in building highways and bridges, and there-
fore the agency was an instrument of the states. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1958). See Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Alabama
Bridge Corp., 59 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1932). But cf Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 399 (1979) (Court found that "[i]n discharging their
duties as officials of TRPA, the state and county appointees necessarily have also
served the interests of the political units that appointed them," but did not find that
the agency was a state agency, rather, that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply).
33. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir.
1958).
34. Id.
35. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
36. The precedential value of Petty on the agency immunity issue is not altogether
certain. The specific question dealt with by the Court was whether a sue-and-be-sued
clause in the compact acted as a waiver of any immunity the agency might have. Six
justices concluded that the clause did act as a waiver, but of that majority only three
justices reached the question of constitutional immunity. The others, having found a
waiver, thought it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. The three justices
in dissent apparently agreed the Eleventh Amendment applied to the agency, differ-
ing only on the question of the waiver's existence. The Court seemed to rely upon the
findings of the lower court, rather than to develop its own analysis. The Court as-
sumed arguendo that the compact agency had immunity. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 279 (1959).
In Byram River v. Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the district court
recognized that the Supreme Court's Petty opinion did not settle whether compact
agencies have Eleventh Amendment protection. As noted above, the Supreme Court
(Vol. 19:240
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In Edelman r. Jordan,7 the Supreme Court adopted the Ford Mo-
tor analysis to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a
suit against state officers.38 Public-aid recipients seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief sued former directors of the Illinois Department
of Public Aid. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants administered certain
public aid programs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court of Appeals upheld an award of retroactive benefit payment to
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the award
would ultimately be satisfied from state funds and accordingly was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court conceded that there
was an exception to the bar where only prospective equitable relief is
sought, but found that the award in question did not fit within the
exception.39 Although the circuit court characterized the award as
"equitable restitution," the Supreme Court found controlling the fact
was able to avoid the constitutional question in Petty, for it was apparent that the
compact agency in that case had consented to suit. The court in Byram River ap-
proached the problem of whether the amendment immunized a compact agency from
suit as an open question. See note 23 supra. See also note 29 supra.
37 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
38. The cases in which the courts have established official immunity from the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity are distinguishable from those where official
immunity is based on the common law doctrine of immunity. See Note, The Eleventh
Amendment as .4pphed to State Agencies: A Survey of the Cases and a Proposed
Modelfor Analsis, 22 VILL. L. REV. 153 (1976). Characterization of an officer as
other than a state officer affects constitutional immunity, but not immunity derived
from the common law doctrine. Based upon practical policy considerations, the com-
mon law doctnne of immunity traditionally has been applied to both state and federal
officers. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951). Essentially, the doctrine is founded upon the belief that governmental officers
should be free to exercise their duties without fear of damage suits resulting from acts
undertaken in their official capacities. The privilege is granted to officials so such
suits will not inhibit the administration of governmental policies and programs. Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). Unlike the constitutional immunities, it would
appear that the common law doctrine of immunity is not necessarily limited to state
or federal offices. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (speech or debate clause); U.S.
CONST. amend. XI (state immunity provision). See also note 53 infra.
39 See Ev Parte Young. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court in Edelman noted that,
even when the award will have a substantial effect on a state treasury, an action for
prospective equitable relief normally will stand under the amendment. 415 U.S. 651,
664-68 (1974). "But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these cases were the
necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in
nature" Id. at 667-68. The Court distinguished the award in Edelman on the
grounds that it was equivalent to an award of monetary damages. Although it can
scarcely be doubted that the award in Edelman was "the necessary result" of compli-
ance with a prospective decree, it appears that the Court found the directness of the




that the award would be paid from state funds. The Court held that
the Eleventh Amendment barred the action against the state officers
because the state was the real party in interest.4 °
Jacobson marks a significant shift in judicial characterization of
compact agencies and offers an unexpected approach to the issue of
immunity for compact agency officers. First, Jacobson abandons the
Ford Motor analysis which controlled previous judicial applications
of Eleventh Amendment immunity.4 1 The opinion did not refer to
the ultimate source of funds that a judgment might claim. Rather,
relying completely upon the Supreme Court's Petty opinion,42 the
Ninth Circuit in Jacobson accepted, as a rule, the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment applies to compact agencies.43
At least one federal district court has recognized that the Petty
opinion never reached the constitutional question." Regardless of
precedent, however, it is apparent that Jacobson applied the Eleventh
Amendment to the TRPA without considering whether a judgment
against the agency would deplete state funds, and in so doing short-
cut the traditional test for Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Although the Jacobson court treated the TRPA as an arm of the
state for agency immunity purposes, 45 it established immunity for
agency officers on the theory that the TRPA was a "regional legisla-
ture.",46 The dual characterization represents a rejection of the tradi-
tional state-federal view of government and a recognition of compact
40. For other applications of the Eleventh Amendment to state officers, see Great
N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Roth-
stein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972); Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D.
Maine 1970).
41. 323 U.S. 459 (1945). See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
42. 359 U.S. 275 (1959). See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
43. Jacobson v. TRPA, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. Byram River v. Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 36
supra.
45. If one accepts the Jacobson interpretation of Petty (that the Eleventh Amend-
ment applies to compact agencies), the characterization of a compact agency as a state
agency appears superfluous. If the amendment applies to compact agencies it is un-
necessary to identify the agency with a state. If, however, the Byram Riper interpreta-
tion of Petty is accepted, it appears essential that the compact agency be identified
with a state. By its terms, the amendment bars only suits "commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. See note 8 supra. Under
the Ford Motor test, an agency would be sufficiently identifiable with a state to qual-
ify for Eleventh Amendment immunity if an action brought against the agency would
ultimately be satisfied by state funds. See note 29 supra.
46. In its earlier Jacobson opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
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agencies as a distinct species. The court established immunity for the
TRPA officers, not on the basis of their affiliations with state or fed-
eral government, but upon their identification as "regional legisla-
tors." '4 7 The novel characterization clearly and intentionally breaks
from the state-federal view of government traditionally characteriz-
ing judicial treatment of compact agencies.48
Treating agency officers as the third-type "regional legislators,"
the difficulty of employing the "regional legislature" concept to resolve the question
of agency immunity.
Perhaps an argument could be made that, because the TRPA is not a federal
agency, it is not "the government" and therefore the Fifth Amendment is inap-
plicable, just as the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable if the TRPA is not a
state agency. This reasoning, however, could lead to the untenable conclusion
that the TRPA is immune from suit because of its somewhat unique status: part
state and part federal but not entirely either.
558 F.2d at 936. Despite these reservations, the court fully embraced the concept for
purposes of resolving the question of officers' immunity. See also Lake Country Es-
tates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391, 404 (1979).
47. Jacobson v. TRPA, 566 F.2d 1353, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. A comparison of the court's first and second Jacobson opinions suggests a
clear intent to introduce the concept of a third-type "regional legislature" to judicial
thinking in full recognition of the problems inherent in the concept. The court's treat-
ment of the official immunity question was virtually identical in both opinions: in
each, the court suggested that immunity should be granted the agency officers qua
"regional legislators." On the issue of agency immunity, however, the opinions di-
verged.
In the first opinion, the court avoided deciding whether the agency could claim
constitutional immunity, but introduced and discussed the concept of interstate legis-
lation by way of dicta. There, the court ventured that the recognition of an interstate
legislative body would present problems for a system traditionally based in a dichoto-
mous conceptualization of government. See note 46 supra. The court found, how-
ever. that such difficulties would not be so great as to be unresolvable by the "judicial
inventiveness" inherent in the federal courts. Jacobson v. TRPA, 558 F.2d 928, 937
(9th Cir. 1977). On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit held that the compact agency was in
effect an agency of the state, hence immune from suit under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, but maintained its previous prescriptions for treatment of the "regional legisla-
tors." Thus stood the court's dual characterization of the compact agency,
unreconciled and unexplained.
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agcy., 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the paradox. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
Jacobson holding, the Court found that officers of the compact agency were immune
from suit as "regional legislators." See note 53 infra. On the question whether the
Eleventh Amendment immunized the agency, however, the Court took a different
approach. Whereas the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the amendment applied to the
compact agency was predicated on the finding that the agency was an arm of the state,
the Supreme Court avoided the state agency characterization. The Court concluded
that the compact agency was not immune because the states did not bestow their




rather than as state or federal officers, the Ninth Circuit denies the
officers a constitutional basis for immunity. That constitutional basis
for state officers is the Eleventh Amendment, 49 and for federal legis-
lative officers it is the speech or debate clause.50 The availability of
the constitutional immunity from suit is dependent, by terms of the
provisions, upon the finding of a minimal association with the speci-
fied office or sovereign. To the extent that those provisions are based
in a dichotomous state-federal view of government, a "regional legis-
lature" and "regional legislators" are excluded from the constitu-
tional grant of immunity.5 The Jacobson opinion fails to mention
the constitutional immunity in regard to compact agency officers.
For traditional sources of immunity,52 the concept of a "regional
legislature" may have other serious implications. By process of elimi-
nation, if there is no constitutionally based immunity from suit for
officials designated "regional legislators," any immunity granted such
officers apparently must arise from the common law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.53 Under common law, immunity from suit was rec-
a state agency. As such, it avoided the paradox of regional legislators in a state
agency.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. The constitutional basis of immunity for federal legislators is found in the
speech or debate clause:
The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason, Fel-
ony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The historical precedents of the clause suggest that the
persons to whom the privilege is granted should be narrowly limited to those men-
tioned in terms by the provision. See generall, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951).
51. Clearly, the Constitution makes no express provisions for the role of a "re-
gional legislature" in the American system. On the contrary, the Tenth Amendment
strongly suggests that a third, distinct species of legislative body is precluded: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. Nor can the compact clause be claimed as support for an independent
regional legislature. That clause is a certain affirmation of federal power in the form
of a limitation on state power: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress...,
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10,
cl. 3. Constitutional immunity from suit has accordingly been applied only to state
and federal officials.
52. Where immunity from suit is not available under the Eleventh Amendment,
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity may apply. See note 38 supra.
53. Id. There would appear to be no initial difficulty in applying the common law
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ognized as an aspect of sovereignty.54 The difficulty with basing
immunity for "regional legislators" on the common law doctrine,
therefore, is that it necessarily implies the sovereignty of the subject.
To ascribe common law immunity to an administrative body, as
Jacobson suggests, is to endow that body with a large measure of
sovereignty." The introduction of a class of regional sovereigns
would pose serious difficulties for the existing federal system.
The significance of Jacobson extends beyond its holding that com-
pact agency officials are entitled to the same immunity granted state
and federal legislators. Importantly, the court granted the immunity
to TRPA officials qua "regional legislators." Jacobson thus signifies
that the common law doctrine of official immunity is applicable to
other than state and federal officials. With that limitation removed,
immunity may now be available to a broad range of intra-state offi-
doctrine to agency officers, for the doctrine is based in general policy considerations.
If the rationale for the doctrine of immunity is that it prohibits suits from impairing
the effective administration of governmental policies and programs, then it is at least
prima facie applicable to compact agency officers.
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), peti-
tioners argued that common law official immunity should be limited to the state and
federal levels and should be denied to compact agency officials. The Supreme Court
held that compact agency officers were entitled to the same measure of immunity
afforded state and federal legislators. Id. at 405. Relying on Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Lake Country Estates opinion observed that the granting of
common law official immunity was qualified by the need for the immunity to protect
the public good. The Court found the need equally compelling whether the official be
a federal, state, or regional legislator. The opinion concluded that "to the extent the
evidence discloses that these individuals [compact agency officials] were acting in a
capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are entitled to
absolute immunity from federal damages liability." 440 U.S. at 406 (1979). Justice
Marshall and Justice Blackmun, dissenting in part in separate opinions, objected to
the majority's functional analysis in that it appeared to provide immunity for mem-
bers of all levels of political structures. Id. at 406-09.
54. The oft-stated formulation of the doctrine of immunity is "the King can do no
wrong." It is an attribute firmly established through history that a sovereign cannot
be sued without its consent. See generally Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Reimel, Interstate Agencies, Their Tort Dilem-
mas and a Federal Solution, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 407, 422-23 (1977).
55. See Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts. A Questionable Federal
Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987 (1965). Engdahl presents a more cautious opinion. In
his view, recognition of compact agencies as independent interstate legislatures would
permit, although not require, the inference that interstate agencies created by
compact are subdivisions of neither the state nor the federal government, but are
political entities suigeneris, exercising a limited sovereignty distinct from that of
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cials as well. Jacobson also imparts a significant break from the di-
chotomous state-federal view that traditionally has controlled
judicial treatment of compact agencies. For the first time, a federal
court has recognized the unique and independent nature of compact
agencies as such. Regardless of whether the opinion recognized or in
effect created the "regional legislature," its impact upon the federal
and democratic system may be substantial.
James K. Horstman
Washington University Open Scholarship
